In the comments section for a Jeff Francoeur post on Monday, Brian wrote, “If he hits .300 and slugs .500 I won’t give a damn if his OBP is also .300.”
I happen to disagree — the problem with OPS is that it overvalues slugging percentage relative to on-base percentage, and on-base percentage plays a greater role in helping a team score runs. This is why more OBP-driven stats like wOBA have come into vogue, and a nice overview of the principles distinguishing wOBA from OBP and OPS can be found here.
Regardless, Brian’s comment intrigued me, because it struck me that slugging over .500 with a .300 on-base percentage is probably difficult to do. After all, as I’ve written — and plenty of people have written before me — if you expose to the world that you’re willing to swing at so many pitches, you’re unlikely to see a whole lot of pitches to drive.
So I consulted the incredible — and totally worth the price of subscription — baseball-reference play index to see how often it had been done.
Thrice. At least with the plate appearances to qualify for the batting title since 1901. And one of the guys who did it was a Met, and one of the guys who did it is currently a Met:
| Rk | Player | Year ▴ | OBP | SLG | Age | Tm |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Dave Kingman | 1976 | .286 | .506 | 27 | NYM |
| 2 | Tony Armas | 1984 | .300 | .531 | 30 | BOS |
| 3 | Mike Jacobs | 2008 | .299 | .514 | 27 | FLA |
Plus, as Twitterer OldBiscuitPants (one of my favorite Twitter handles and old baseball nicknames, FWIW) points out, Armas actually posted an OBP ever-so-slightly above .300 in 1984: .30044.
So, to Brian’s comment, if Francoeur manages to slug .500 with an OBP at or below .300, it’s probably worth giving a damn, because we’d be witnessing something exceptionally rare in the annals of baseball history.
Almost certainly not a good rare thing, mind you, but something I’m sure would be entertaining as hell to behold.
Tedquarters 
I’ve struggled with the notion that OPS overvalues slugging percentage at the expense of on-base percentage, and I’m not sure what the answer is. Since a double can drive a runner in from first or clear the bases if they are loaded, why should that not be worth twice as much as a walk? Since a homerun means at least one automatic run and will drive anyone on base in, why should that not be worth 4x a walk? I’m really not sure what the answer is, but I’m curoius why you (and many others) believe that slugging percentage is overvalued in this equation.
I think a stronger argument can be made that a walk is overvalued compared to hit in OPS. Singles advance runners from first to third and from second to home and put pressure on the defense and can lead to errors and thus additional bases being taken, walks do not.
OK, this is definitely a tough thing to grasp and I’ve spent a lot of time grappling with it myself. My understanding is this: The worst thing a hitter can do is make an out, and on-base percentage measures his ability to not make outs. While hitting a home run is undoubtedly the best thing a hitter can do, it is not truly four times more valuable than a single because, while he definitely scores and drive in a run when he hits a home run, he may very well drive in a run or eventually score when he singles. The most important thing is that he both reach based safely and didn’t make an out, lengthening his team’s time at bat and increasing its opportunities to score runs.
OBP is definitely not a perfect stat because it values the walk the same as the home run, which is obviously not right. wOBA is based on linear weights — unique run totals, relative to zero (which would be making an out), assigned to each outcome — and adjusted to look like OBP for easier digestion.
Tom Tango, who invented the stat, explains it a bit here, and includes the linear weights he’s calculated for each of the most common outcomes.
Oh, and now I see Max has linked the same Tom Tango bit.
“Since a homerun means at least one automatic run and will drive anyone on base in, why should that not be worth 4x a walk?”
Because 4 is just a random number that was picked because it’s the number of bases you get with a homerun. It does not correspond to run production.
In fact a homerun, on average is worth a little under 3 times as much as a walk and a little over 2 times as much as a single.
http://www.insidethebook.com/woba.shtml
Is “The Book” worth buying? If so, I’ll order it from Amazon right now.
But a walk is not as good as a single (as indicated by your stat regarding a homerun’s value compared to a walk and a single), and shouldn’t that balance out any concerns regarding slugging percentage being too heavily weighted? Does the Book adequately explain these assertions?
My concern with OPS has always been that since a walk is measured the same as a single, a .240 hitter who walks a lot (Nick Swisher) can appear to be as good as a .330 hitter who walks some (Derek Jeter), when I think we can all agree that Jeter had a better year than Swisher last year although their OPS’s were virtually the same.
If you’re saying that OBP weighs walks too heavily compared to singles and other hits, you’re absolutely right. OBP is an incomplete stat. OPS is a whole other mess because by adding SLG and OBP, it’s almost like it’s counting singles twice.
I’d definitely recommend “The Book” if you want a good primer on many of the more popular sabermetric terms. wOBA in particular.
There’s also a fun chapter on optimizing lineups with some really unorthodox conclusions.
Just saw your response Ted, I guess I should buy The Book.
This reminds of Bill Belicheck’s call to go for it on 4th and 2 against the Colts last year from his own 33 or so. The statisticians said he was correct and I don’t doubt them, but if Tom Coughlin ever did that, I’d be yelling and cursing at the TV.